(click on a Myth to take you to more detailed evidence below)
| Myths | Facts |
| It would relieve traffic at the Dartford Crossing by 20% | Any reduction in traffic at Dartford would still leave it over capacity – 20% is a meaningless figure. In nearly all instances any relief would last for less time than it would take to build the new crossing. |
| It would reduce traffic | The scheme would increase overall traffic, slowing down journeys on the M25 and A13 by up to 20%. On the M2 it’s by up to 30%. |
| We need to get on and build it as something needs to be done | Building the scheme is no quick fix as it would take at least 7 years to construct. During that time the construction traffic would cause significant delays, making things worse. |
| It is good for the economy | The scheme would only increase the economy by 0.03%, while it inhibits the delivery of jobs and housing in Thurrock and restricts other businesses. National Highways has refused to allow scrutiny of its claims. |
| It is good for business | Many businesses objected to the scheme including Tilbury Port and DP World. The scheme limits Tilbury’s ability to expand and the scheme design means a new access road to Tilbury would be too costly to build. |
| It is safe | The scheme would result in an extra 26 fatalities and 182 serious injuries over its lifetime, and is being built to Smart Motorway standards |
| Public transport can use the new crossing | Local bus services would have to go on such long detours to use the new road they would not be viable – National Highways refused to amend the design |
| Emergency services are happy with the design | Emergency Services have a number of concerns with the project |
| The costs are under control | It’s likely the scheme would cost far more than £10bn to build, especially with all the other roads needed to make it function (that National Highways cut from the scheme to hide its true cost). |
| The DfT has kept a close eye on costs | Figures from the 2020 Outline Business Case were still being used in 2023 after a period of high inflation, hiding the scheme’s true cost during the DfT’s scrutiny of the project |
| There is transparency about the project | The Cabinet Office is trying to stop important oversight documents about the scheme from being published |
| With £1bn already spent on it, we should go ahead and build it | We shouldn’t throw good money after bad, especially as it is likely to cost well over £10bn. The Government pulled the plug on HS2 Phase 2, despite having spent £2.3bn planning it. |
| It has been properly scrutinised | Amazingly, for the largest road scheme for a generation the Examination panel did not have an expert in traffic modelling. Also many topics were not properly scrutinised due to a lack of time. |
| The traffic model shows it works | National Highways forced local councils to sign confidentiality agreements to stop them comparing information on the 10 year old traffic model. This has prevented proper scrutiny of predicted traffic due to the LTC. |
| It has been properly designed | The LTC fails on every one of its objectives (set by National Highways). On day one, the junction at Orsett Cock (where the LTC meets the A13) would be at capacity. The LTC makes things worse for Tilbury and London Gateway ports. |
| If the Dartford crossings have to close, then traffic will still be able to flow | National Highways hasn’t done modelling to test this. Supporting infrastructure such as the A2 (linking Dartford to the LTC) would be overwhelmed. Communities in Thurrock and Gravesham would continue to be swamped with traffic when incidents occur. |
| It would reduce air pollution | The scheme will increase air pollution over a wider area, increasing the burden on the NHS |
| It reduces carbon emissions | Despite much talk of reducing construction emissions, this is mostly greenwash. Using hydrogen and electric vehicles would push costs up and change little. The scheme would still likely increase carbon emissions by over 6 million tonnes. |
| The planning application is 2,383 documents and 359,000 pages long | The Development Consent Order (DCO) planning application was actually 554 documents and totalled 63,330 pages |
| The planning application has cost £800m | The two DCO planning applications (National Highways had to withdraw one, as it was inadequate) cost £245.3m+VAT = £294m |
Note: This page is currently being edited to complete the references for sources of information but the facts remain accurate
Myth
It would relieve traffic at the Dartford Crossing by 20%
Fact
The main justification for the LTC is that it would provide long-term relief for the Dartford Crossing. However, international consultants Stantec working for Thurrock Council, calculated that National Highways’ own modelling showed the relief at Dartford would only last 5 years [1] [2]. This is less than the time it would take to build the road. This is due to induced traffic (caused by suppressed demand and people making extra trips as a result of a new road). The LTC could become the world’s most expensive sticking plaster.
Remarkably, National Highways did not include HGVs and LGVs in their induced traffic modelling, only cars. So the traffic increases are likely to be much higher if HGV freight movements increase, as National Highways state separately. The congestion at Dartford could be back up to existing levels even sooner than predicted.
The 20% traffic reduction figure is fictional and is not helpful in understanding what this means with regards to current traffic levels at Dartford.
SOURCES
[1] LTC: Comments on Applicant’s Submission at Deadline 9, Thurrock Council, para 7.6.20, 15 December 2023
[2] LTC: Local Impact Report, Thurrock Council, para 7.1.2 b, 18 July 2023
Myth
It would reduce traffic
Fact
The scheme would increase overall traffic, slowing down journeys on the M25 and A13 by up to 20% by 2045, after around ten years of operation. On the M2 journey times would increase by up to 30% [3]. This is a scheme that’s making things worse.
The LTC would also increase traffic on local roads in Thurrock and Gravesham, with huge increases in air and noise pollution. Due to cost cutting and poor design, there is inadequate infrastructure to allow traffic to migrate between the crossings if any incidents occur [4].
SOURCES
[3] Lower Thames Crossing 7.9 Transport Assessment Appendix C, Data from Plate 1.1 and Tables 1.1 & 1.3, National Highways, September 2023
[4] Incidents – LTC/Dartford Crossing, Thames Crossing Action Group
Myth
We need to get on and build it as something needs to be done
Fact
This is the desperate cry from people who know the game is up. Building the scheme is no quick fix (as they well know) as it would take at least 7 years to construct. During that time the construction traffic would cause significant delays on the surrounding road network, making things worse. Far better to take a little more time so we don’t end up with a very expensive white elephant on our hands.
Myth
It is good for the economy
Fact
The scheme would only increase the economy by 0.03%, while it inhibits the delivery of jobs and housing in Thurrock outlined in its Local Plan. It also restricts other businesses such as Tilbury Docks and DP World’s London Gateway.
Its Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) is just 0.48, meaning that for every £1 spent on building the LTC, it will only generate 48p of economic benefits. It would lose the economy money. To inflate the BCR and to justify the £9bn price tag, National Highways included unevidenced “wider economic benefits”. Even then, the BCR was only 1.22, meaning that a return of just £1.22 for every pound spent, or just 22p net benefit [4]. According to the DfT’s value for money framework its BCR is ranked as “low” value for money [5].
This figure was gained by artificially suppressing the costs as National Highways removed key roads and junctions from the final design and used an unrealistically low inflation rate [6]. National Highways has refused to allow scrutiny of its calculations, suggesting it has also inflated the benefits.
Rail freight and public transport schemes have a far higher BCR, and the Government would get more bang for buck by investing in sustainable transport, rather than 20th century roadbuilding.
SOURCES
[4] LTC Combined Modelling and Appraisal Report, Table 7.17, National Highways, October 2022
[5] DfT’s Value for Money Framework, Box 5.1, Department for Transport, 2015
[6] Economic Appraisal Report, Table 6.1, National Highways, October 2022
Myth
It is good for business
Fact
Many businesses objected to the scheme including Tilbury Port and DP World. The scheme limits Tilbury Port’s ability to expand, due to the location of the tunnel. The scheme design also means a new access road to Tilbury would be too costly to build.
Additionally the extra traffic and congestion on the wider road network will cause delays and will not be good for business.
Myth
It is safe
Fact
The scheme would result in an extra 26 fatalities and 182 serious injuries over its lifetime. This is the only known road scheme which will result in more people being killed and injured.
It is also being built to Smart Motorway standards, a design much hated by motorists. These roads are prone to congestion caused by breakdowns (as there is no hard shoulder onto which to pull over) and incidents as there is little safe space with refuges so far apart. This scheme was designed prior to smart motorways being banned
Myth
Public transport can use the new crossing
Fact
Due to the junction designs, local bus services would have to go on such long detours to use the new road that any services would not be viable. National Highways refused to amend the design to accommodate affordable and reliable local buses.
Myth
Emergency services are happy with the design
Fact
Emergency Services have a number of concerns with the project which can be seen by the number of unresolved issues in their Statement of Common Ground submitted to the scheme’s Examination.
Myth
The costs are under control
Fact
It’s likely the true cost of the scheme would be far higher than £10bn. This is for several reasons:
- The £9bn cost is several years old now and inflation will mean it is much higher
- A lot of other infrastructure (roads and junctions) will be needed to make the scheme function that National Highways cut from the scheme to hide its true cost.
- The extra traffic on local roads and the wider road network will increase pressure for further expenditure.
Myth
The DfT has kept a close eye on costs
Fact
Figures from the 2020 Outline Business Case were still being used by the DfT in its oversight procedures in 2023. This was after a period of high inflation, when cost rises were likely to have been significant. This is not a responsible way to manage a project.
Myth
There is transparency about the project
Fact
The Cabinet Office is trying to stop important oversight documents about the scheme from being published, hiding accountability for the scheme’s costs and public spending.
Myth
With £1bn already spent on it, we should go ahead and build it
Fact
We shouldn’t throw good money after bad. The scheme is likely to cost well over £10bn, which would represent an even bigger loss to the public purse. Additionally, this was no impediment to the previous Government pulling the plug on HS2 Phase 2, despite having spent £2.3bn planning it.
Myth
It has been properly scrutinised
Fact
Amazingly, for the largest road scheme for a generation the Examination panel did not have an expert in traffic modelling. This should have been a pre-requisite for a scheme with such widespread and complex traffic implications, requiring a high level of technical knowledge to understand the modelling and assumptions made by National Highways. Something made harder by National Highways forcing local authorities to sign confidentiality agreements (see below).
Also many topics at the Examination were not properly scrutinised due to a lack of time as a result of such a large and complex scheme.
Myth
The traffic model shows it works
Fact
National Highways forced local councils to sign confidentiality agreements to stop them comparing information on the 10 year old traffic model. This has prevented proper scrutiny of predicted traffic due to the LTC, stopping National Highways’ many claims about the scheme from being independently assessed.
Myth
It has been properly designed
Fact
The LTC fails on every one of its objectives (set by National Highways) as assessed by international consultants Stantec, working for Thurrock Council [7].
On day one, the junction at Orsett Cock (where the LTC meets the A13) would be at capacity. The LTC would make things worse for Tilbury and London Gateway ports and is a key reason why they were involved in making representations to the Examination [8].
SOURCES
[7] Lower Thames Crossing, Thurrock Council Comments on Applicant’s Submissions at Deadline 9 (D9), Figures 1-3, Thurrock Council, December 2023
[8] Lower Thames Crossing, Thurrock Council Comments on Applicant’s Submissions at Deadline D6A and D7, Appendix D, December 2023
Myth
If the Dartford crossings have to close, then traffic will still be able to flow
Fact
National Highways hasn’t done modelling to test this – at least it wasn’t presented to the Examination for scrutiny. Supporting infrastructure such as the A2 (linking Dartford to the LTC) would be overwhelmed. Communities in Thurrock and Gravesham would continue to be swamped with traffic when incidents occur.
Myth
It would reduce air pollution
Fact
The scheme will increase air pollution over a wider area, increasing the burden on the NHS
Myth
It reduces carbon emissions
Fact
Despite much talk of reducing construction emissions, this is mostly greenwash. Using hydrogen and electric vehicles would push costs higher and change little. The scheme would still likely increase carbon emissions by over 6 million tonnes.
Myth
The planning application is 2,383 documents and 359,000 pages long
Fact
This myth originated from a roads lobby group called Britain Remade, but has been repeated – unchecked – by mainstream media, including in the Times, FT, and politicians.
We have fact checked these figures and have discovered they have been inflated sixfold. The Development Consent Order (DCO) planning application was actually 554 documents (not 2,383 claimed), and totalled 63,330 pages, not 359,000 [9].
We can only presume that Britain Remade inadvertently included all of National Highways’ evidence submitted to the 6-month long examination, including many duplications and rebuttals of evidence. It did not count the documents in the actual planning application, but instead used these inaccurate and inflated figures. You can view how we calculated our figures here.
It is inevitable that a scheme of the scale and cost of the LTC will require a large and detailed planning application. Due to its high cost and large environmental impacts, National Highways has to work hard to justify the scheme and its £9bn price tag, alongside the 6.6 million tonnes CO2, and large environmental impacts. Many of the DCO documents are required by primary legislation, and many of the DCO documents are detailed plans and maps, showing the 23 km route.
The longest document in the DCO planning application is the 9,000 page Book of Reference, comprising 14% of the page total. This lists every piece of land that has to be compulsorily purchased. DCO applications are unusual as they include all the legal documents and evidence required to compulsorily purchase (CPO) land, unlike normal highways planning applications where CPOs are dealt with separately.
However, National Highways will often submit unnecessarily long documents, partly because consultants want to justify their fees but also to overwhelm and confuse their opponents and the Planning Inspectorate. Some documents are also rather bizarre such as the List of all respondents to statutory consultation in the Consultation Report [APP-078] which is 900 pages of mostly a single column of objectors’ registration numbers. Despite the length of the many documents, vital information can often be missing or obscured.
Those with a political agenda have made a lot of noise about the length of the LTC Development Consent Order (DCO) planning application, with some using it as an excuse to push through planning reforms that would cut environmental protections and democratic participation. However, using the largest ever road project to demonstrate a point about planning shows the weakness of their case, as the DCO application is not typical. They also fail to scrutinise National Highways’ competency, since it had to withdraw its first DCO application for the LTC (a first), because the application was so poor.
Sources
[9] The full DCO planning application documents can be viewed here on the Planning Inspectorate website
Myth
The planning application has cost £800m
Fact
The £800 million figure came from a letter the then roads minister Richard Holden MP wrote to the Transport Select Committee on 12 August 2023 [10], regarding the costs so far of the Lower Thames Crossing. In it he said: “Over £800m has been spent on the Lower Thames Crossing project to date. This is not solely on planning costs and is across the project, including technical surveys and investigations, land purchasing costs as well as on the three major National Highways contracts to deliver the Lower Thames Crossing“.
TAN asked National Highways to provide a breakdown of these costs [11]. Its response showed that the largest expenditure was for technical surveys and investigations, £307.4m+VAT = £368.88m, or 46% of the total spent. The numerous and inadequate consultations are a tiny part of the costs so far, just under 4% of the money spent. National Highways has also spent £97.7m+VAT = £117m, on land purchasing costs. The two DCO planning applications (National Highways had to withdraw one, as the Planning Inspectorate said it was inadequate) cost £245.3m+VAT = £294m, or 37% of the total spent.
Sources
[10] Letter from roads minister, Richard Holden MP, to the transport select committee, 12 August 2023
[11] TAN FOI request to National Highways for the breakdown of costs on the Lower Thames Crossing
Further reading
Lower Thames Crossing: a dinosaur scheme from another era that really should be extinct, a report by Dr Colin Black, September 2024
Decision time for England’s biggest road project. What are the implications? (Part One), Professor Phil Goodwin, TAPAS.network, 6 February 2024
Decision time for England’s biggest road project. What are the implications? (Part Two), Professor Phil Goodwin, TAPAS.network, 21 March 2024
Lower Thames Crossing Facts, Transport Action Network
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